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  INTRODUCTION: REMEDIES DISCUSSION FORUM 
Russell L. Weaver* 
Each year, the Remedies Discussion Forum brings together prominent 
remedies scholars from all over the world to discuss important and topical 
remedial issues. In 2019, the forum met at the Université Paris Dauphine PSL 
Research University (Paris, France). For this forum, participants were invited 
to write about any of three topics: remedies related to obligations (a topic 
could be approached comparatively or could involve an examination of how 
and when the courts of one country can or should enforce judgments from 
other countries); controversial remedies (which could be broadly defined but, 
in particular, can involve remedies for sexual misconduct and/or sexual 
harassment); recent developments in remedies, which could involve recent 
remedial developments from the author’s own country or could involve a 
comparative perspective. The papers being submitted here were “discussion 
drafts,” submitted in advance of the forum to stimulate discussion, which 
have been refined in light of the discussions. 
Professor Sirko Harder’s contribution to the forum was entitled 
Negotiating Damages in English Contract Law.1 The article focuses on the 
U.K. Supreme Court’s holding in One Step (Support) Ltd. v. Morris-Garner,2 
which held that damages for breach of contract may be measured by the 
amount that the innocent party (the claimant) could have demanded from the 
breaching party for a release of the latter from the relevant obligation. In other 
words, a court may award a “notional fee,” essentially permitting the 
negotiation of damages, designed to compensate for the claimant’s loss of the 
right to control the use of an asset. Professor Harder examines the 
development of this remedial approach in English contract law and seeks to 
evaluate the efficacy of the approach. 
Professor Anthony Sebok’s article is entitled Going Bare in the Law of 
Assignments: When Is an Assignment Champertous?3 In this article, he 
discusses David Capper’s article, The Assignment of a Bare Right to Litigate,4 
which analyzes both the English Court of Appeal’s holding in Simpson v. 
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Norfolk & Norwich University Hospital NHS Trust5 and the Irish Supreme 
Court’s decision in SPV Osus Ltd. v. HSBC Institutional Trust Services 
(Ireland).6 In his article, Capper makes several observations: maintenance is 
less offensive to the law of champerty than the assignment of “bare” claims; 
and the law of champerty can, and ought to, distinguish the assignment of 
bare claims from other types of assignment, and the historical trend of 
allowing the assignment of choses of action should not be extended to bare 
assignments. Professor Sebok attempts to draw parallels between the 
treatment of champerty and maintenance in the United States and the 
Commonwealth, and he uses American approaches to illustrate the 
limitations of Capper’s approach. 
Professor John McCamus’ article is entitled Restitutionary Remedies in 
Three-Party Cases: A Comparative Perspective.7 He begins by noting that 
almost all restitution litigation involves “two-party” cases in which the 
plaintiff claims that the defendant has been unjustly enriched at the plaintiff’s 
expense. McCamus’ focus is on “three-party” situations in which a third-
party has transferred value to the defendant, which for reasons of justice 
ought to have been or should now be transferred to the plaintiff. As he notes, 
not all of these cases involve wrongful conduct by the third-party, but there 
will be situations when the plaintiff may have a greater right to the 
enrichment. McCamus analyzes the traditional English position concerning 
third-party claims, and he contrasts that doctrine with recent developments in 
American and Canadian restitutionary doctrine, noting that American and 
Canadian doctrine allows restitutionary relief in a much broader range of 
three-party cases.  
Professor Margaret Allars’ article is entitled Private Law Remedies and 
Public Law Standards: An Awkward Statutory Intrusion into Tort Liability of 
Public Authorities.8 She notes that statutes have modified the civil liability of 
public authorities, but she sets up her analysis by analyzing the common law 
which preceded the statutory intrusions. She then analyzes Australian and 
UK law on the subject and concludes that Australian statutory alterations 
have not necessarily produced either good or desirable results. 
Professors Elise Bant and Jeanne Marie Paterson submitted an article to 
the forum entitled Evolution and Revolution: The Remedial Smorgasbord for 
Misleading Conduct in Australia.9 In their article, they focus on the Trade 
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Practices Act 1974 (Cth) which prohibited statements in commerce or trade 
that are “misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive.” The Act 
does not require fault as a condition precedent to liability and is important 
because it introduced a host of remedies for misleading conduct, including 
the power to vary contracts retroactively. They note that the Act has been 
“proven enormously influential, having been re-enacted, replicated and 
repeated dozens of times in different contexts under various Australian state 
and federal legislation,” and reaching “into almost every corner of 
commercial life.” In addition, the Act’s remedial approach has influenced 
analogous common law and equitable remedies and shifted Australian views 
regarding the relationship between “right and remedy in Australian law and 
practice.” 
Finally, my article examines the problem of “nationwide injunctions.”10 
Over the last twenty years, but especially during the Obama and Trump 
administrations, trial courts have become increasingly comfortable with the 
idea that they can enter so-called “nationwide injunctions.” While nationwide 
injunctions are usually issued against the federal government, they have also 
been issued against private entities, and in both contexts have been 
controversial. For one thing, the exercise of that authority runs counter to the 
idea that the judicial authority under Article III of the Constitution is limited 
to the “case” or “controversy” before the court. More importantly, lower 
courts often “get it wrong” in the sense that their nationwide injunctions have 
been completely overturned or significantly modified by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. In addition, nationwide injunctions create potential problems. Instead 
of allowing major legal issues to percolate their way through the lower courts, 
thereby providing the Court with the views and analysis of a variety of lower 
court judges, nationwide injunctions cases often move quite quickly through 
the court system to the Court. In the past, the U.S. government has been able 
to adopt a position of non-acquiescence to lower court decisions. In other 
words, it agrees to accept the decision in the particular jurisdiction in which 
a decision was rendered but continues to maintain a contrary position in other 
jurisdictions. Generally, if the government continues to lose in these other 
jurisdictions, that is the end of the matter. The U.S. Supreme Court is 
disinclined to review the matter. On the other hand, if the government’s 
position prevails in other jurisdictions, the U.S. Supreme Court eventually 
intervenes because there is a split among the circuits that needs to be 
resolved. By that point, the facts and the legal issues have come into sharper 
focus and the U.S. Supreme Court can more readily decide the issues. As a 
result, even some supporters of nationwide injunctions recognize that 
nationwide injunctions encourage forum shopping, politicize the courts, 
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create the risk of conflicting injunctions, and potentially give enormous 
power to a single district court judge.  
 
  
